Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

20 March 2024

The Stoics and the Holy Spirit

Stoicism, the ancient school of philosophy, had some excellent ideas. Here’s their explanation of how sound works.

We hear when the air between the sound-emitter and the listener is struck. Then it emits a wave in a spherical shape which spreads and arrives at the ears, in the same way that water in a tank forms waves in circles when a stone is thrown in.
Diogenes Laertios 7.158
Visualisation of a Stoic vision cone made of pneuma. (AI generated)

This is terrific. It’s practically what you’ll hear in a modern classroom. But some Stoic ideas were ... well, less excellent. Here’s their theory of vision.

We see when the light between the viewer and the object is stretched tight, in a conical shape. ... The tip of the conical shape is located at the eye, and its base in the direction of the thing seen. Information about the observed object is conveyed by the stretched air, similarly to a cane.
Diogenes Laertios 7.158

That is, they thought there are vision cones extending out of our eyes. Modern readers sometimes call them ‘vision rays’. Ancient theories of vision came in two main varieties, ‘extramissive’ and ‘intramissive’: stuff either comes out of your eye or enters it. The Stoics were firmly in the extramissive camp. As you move your eye around, it moves the vision cone, like a hand moving a cane. You sense the other end of the cone the same way that you can sense things at the end of the cane.

The Stoics thought of the vision cone as physical but intangible, like air, or light. It was made of a substance that they called pneuma: literally, ‘breath’.

In philosophical contexts, the custom is to translate pneuma as ‘spirit’.

Pneuma and logos

Among the concepts that the Stoics used to talk about how the universe works are two influential words that don’t translate straightforwardly: pneuma, πνεῦμα, literally ‘breath’; and logos, λόγος, literally ‘word’ or ‘utterance’.

Pneuma is the physical medium for interactions that aren’t tangible. Light, vision cones, life force, and the soul are all made of pneuma. Pneuma is a material that’s perceptible, and physically real, but incorporeal.

The word has a heritage in Greek mystic and natural philosophy. In Orphic religion, pneuma refers to a physical manifestation of fate. Here’s a schema in the Orphic Derveni treatise (5th century BCE), as tabulated by Gábor Betegh (2004: 202):

Mythological name Zeus Moira [‘Fate’]
Intellectual aspect mind (nous) wisdom (phronesis)
Physical aspect air (aer) breath (pneuma)

In later centuries the Stoics adopted similar terminologies, while dropping the ‘mythological’ names. So did Philo of Alexandria, a 1st century Jewish Bible interpreter who was heavily influenced by the Stoics. Nous becomes logos, phronesis becomes sophia, aer gets sidetracked into the theory of the elements, pneuma holds on to its place.

The traditional English translation ‘spirit’ comes from the fact that the Latin for ‘breath’ is spiritus. For Stoic thought, a better English translation would be ‘force’ — force in the modern sense of an energy field, like magnetism, or classical gravity. Here’s a precisely accurate description of what the Stoics meant by pneuma:

It’s an energy field created by all living things. It surrounds us and penetrates us; it binds the galaxy together.
Obi-Wan Kenobi, Star wars (1977)
χρῶ τῷ πνεύματι, ὦ Λουκᾶ. (Star wars, 1977)

The ancients didn’t think of gravity and magnetism in terms of ‘forces’. Aristotle, for example, imagined gravity as an intrinsic property, not an interaction: objects with the ‘heaviness’ property have a natural motion towards the centre of the cosmos.

But if you could go back in time and teach Zeno or Chrysippos about classical gravitational or magnetic fields, they’d definitely treat them as species of pneuma.

Then there’s logos. To the Stoics, logos was the principle that the world is rational and behaves in an intelligible way. Logic and maths work, sex causes pregnancy, stuff falls downwards, the sun moves around the ecliptic. That’s logos. It’s their word for what the Orphics and Plato called the cosmic nous, ‘mind’: a template for the self-consistency of the physical world.

In the Orphic Derveni treatise, ‘mind’ is a primordial creative force. Elementary matter is made to coalesce into tangible objects by the ‘colliding mind’: in Greek, krou- + nous, a retcon for ‘Kronos’. Zeus absorbs the primordial forces — ‘colliding mind’, time, the forces of life and creation — so that they become his personal attributes. As a result he acquires the persona of Protogonos, ‘first born’.

In Philo, logos is a personal attribute of God, just as Orphic nous is an attribute of the Protogonos.

And if it happens that someone is not yet worthy of being called ‘son of God’, let them hasten to adorn themselves with his protogonos logos, the eldest of angels, an archangel as it were. It possesses many names. For it is called ‘beginning’, and ‘name of God’, and logos, and ‘human in image’, and ‘the one that sees Israel’. ... for logos, the eldest, is an image of God.
Philo, On the confusion of tongues 146–147 (my translation)

The piling-up of alternate names is in much the same vein as the Derveni treatise.

Modern interpretations of logos in the Christian New Testament regularly take Philo as their starting point — most notably in John 1.1, where logos is a cosmic primordial force that shapes the tangible world.

In the beginning there was the logos, and the logos was an attribute of God, and the logos was God. This was God’s attribute in the beginning. All things came into existence through it, and nothing that exists came into existence without it.
John 1.1–3 (my translation)

Imagine a translation using Philo’s analogies: ‘In the beginning was divine reason’; ‘In the beginning was the noetic realm of incorporeal Forms’. The text could easily be read that way in the 1st century. It echoes earlier Greek thought too: ‘nothing that exists came into existence without it’ sounds almost like it’s from Parmenides.

But does early Christian thought have more in common with Philo, or with the Stoics? Modern scholars normally opt for Philo. I agree that holds true for Paul’s letters. But in the narrative books of the New Testament, pneuma isn’t just an attribute of God. It pops up in other ways too. There, we’re looking at an adaptation of Stoic language.

New Testament pneuma isn’t supernatural: it’s precisely non-supernatural. It’s an attempt to rationalise the supernatural in naturalistic terms. In the present day, believers sometimes try to rationalise a miraculous healing as a logical medical event; in antiquity, pneuma is exactly the same.

Note. On logos in Philo see Hannah 1999: 77–85; Robertson 2018: 9–28. On reading logos in the New Testament in light of Philo, see Boyarin 2017 (but cast as exclusively Jewish, with no mention of Stoicism). On nous in Plato see especially the Timaios, with discussion by e.g. Menn 1995; Mason 2013. On krou- + nous as Orphic creative force, see Derveni papyrus cols. xiv–xvi (cf. Plato Kratylos 396b), with discussion by Betegh 2004: 185–193.

Pneuma in the Bible

The Hebrew Bible often refers to the rūaḥ or ‘wind’ of God. From around the 3rd century BCE onwards, the Bible used in the Diaspora was in Greek: the Septuagint. And the Septuagint instead talks about God’s pneuma.

כי־כל־עוֹד נשמתי בי ורוח אלוֹה באפי׃

ἦ μὴν ἔτι τῆς πνοῆς μου ἐνούσης πνεῦμα δὲ θεῖον τὸ περιόν μοι ἐν ῥισίν.

... as long as my breath [Hb. nishmā, Gr. pnoë] is in me and the spirit [Hb. rūaḥ, Gr. pneuma] of God is in my nostrils, ...

Job 27.3 (MT, LXX, NRSVue)
Note. πνοή and πνεῦμα could both be translated as ‘breath’, given the right context. Philo, Allegory of the holy laws 1.42, discusses the distinction between them in Genesis 1.2 and 2.7.

So when Hellenistic Jews talked about the ‘wind of God’ in Greek, they were using language that already had a naturalistic sense. The dual senses of pneuma, as the rūaḥ of God and as a Stoic physical ‘force’, could be conflated or distinguished as needed.

Visible pneuma and extramissive vision: ‘there stabbed northward a flame of red, the flicker of a piercing Eye ...’ (Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings, 1955; still from The Return of the King, 2003)

Pneuma appears frequently in the New Testament. The earliest gospel, Mark, envisages it as a physical substance. You can immerse people in pneuma.

ὁ Ἰωάννης ... ἐκήρυσσεν ... ἐγὼ ἐβάπτισα ὑμᾶς ἐν ὕδατι, αὐτὸς δὲ βαπτίσει ὑμᾶς ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ.

John [the Baptist] ... proclaimed ..., ‘I baptised you with water, but he will baptise you with holy pneuma.’

Mark 1.8 (my translation)

Notice that the Greek doesn’t refer to ‘the’ Holy Spirit — there’s no article. This is an uncountable noun, a substance, not a specified entity.

When Jesus casts out demons, he doesn’t do it by praying: he uses pneuma as a physical instrument.

‘If I cast out demons with Beelzebul, what do your own sons use to cast them out? They will be your judges, then. But if it is with God’s pneuma that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God is already upon you.’
Matthew 12.27–28 (my translation)

The original version of this passage, Mark 3.22–25, doesn’t mention pneuma. The introduction of pneuma makes the statement more physical, more tangible. Luke 11.15–20 makes the imagery more tactile still, writing ‘God’s finger’ instead of ‘God’s pneuma’.

All modern Bibles beg the question in passages like these by personifying pneuma as ‘the (Holy) Spirit’. That choice anticipates the doctrine of the Trinity. It excludes the meanings that the word had when these passages were written.

Occasionally, pneuma is paired with logos. (And notice that pneuma here is emphatically not an attribute of God!)

Once it became evening they brought to [Jesus] many people who were afflicted by demons, and he cast out the pneumata with logos [ἐξέβαλεν τὰ πνεύματα λόγῳ].
Matthew 8.16 (my translation)

The choice of words makes the subtext extremely clear: we’re firmly in Stoic territory. Again, you have to think about what these words meant at the time. A well informed 1st century reader might very well read it like this:

Jesus cast out the intangible physical phenomena by using a noetic template.

You can’t translate this kind of passage neutrally. Because of course these terms aren’t just Stoic terms: pneuma also means rūaḥ, logos also means ‘word’. If you look at Paul’s letters, it’s much harder to see any hint of Stoicism. There, ‘spirit’ usually is going to be the right translation.

Pneuma in Acts

Inspecting every mention of pneuma in the New Testament would be overkill for a short essay like this, but I have checked every occurrence in Acts. Out of the narrative books, Acts mentions pneuma the most — 35 times per 10,000 words, as compared with 10 to 19 in the gospels. (Among Paul’s letters, Galatians and 1 Corinthians both use it over 80 times per 10,000 words.)

Here’s how Acts uses the word pneuma:

  • 24× (in 19 distinct episodes) physically, as something visible, a fluid substance (normally without a definite article), or a body part: 1.2, 1.5, 2.2–4, 4.8, 4.25, 6.3–5, 6.10, 7.55, 8.15–19, 9.17, 10.38, 11.16, 11.24, 11.28, 13.9, 13.52, 17.16, 18.25, 20.22.
  • 12× (in 11 episodes) as an entity with personhood which speaks: 1.16, 5.32, 8.29, 9.31, 10.19, 11.12, 13.2–4, 15.28, 20.28, 21.11, 28.25.
  • 11× ambiguous, with definite article (perhaps as an attribute of God): 1.8, 2.33, 2.38, 4.31, 5.3 (ambiguous syntax), 5.9, 10.44–47, 11.15, 15.8, 16.6, 19.6.
  • (in 4 episodes) as a supernatural entity other than God: 5.16, 16.16–18, 19.11–16, 23.8–9.
  • in a quotation from the Septuagint: 2.17–18 (≈ Joel 2.28–29).

Pneuma often has the epithet ‘holy’ (ἅγιον πνεῦμα). But even in a text as late as Acts it’s hard to be confident that that isn’t simply meant to be an antithesis to pneumata that are ‘wicked’ or ‘unclean’ (Acts 5.16, 19.11–16). Two passages juxtapose pneuma with logos, both in the third ‘ambiguous’ category (4.31, 16.6).

Some of the passages in the first category — pneuma as a physical substance — clearly envisage it as a fluid:

  • a person can be immersed in pneuma (1.5, 11.16)
  • a person can be anointed with pneuma (10.38)
  • a person can be filled with pneuma (2.4, 4.8, 6.3–5, 7.55, 9.17, 11.24, 13.9, 13.52)
  • pneuma can boil (18.25 ζέων τῷ πνεύματι)
  • pneuma can be transmitted by physical contact (8.15–19, 19.6)
  • pneuma can act as a medium for action at a distance when someone speaks ‘by means of pneuma’ (1.2, 4.25, 11.28)

Modern English-language Bibles can sometimes bring themselves to translate Hebrew rūaḥ as the ‘wind’ of God, instead of ‘Spirit’ with a capital S. And that’s great. It’s reasonable to make an effort with Greek pneuma and logos too!

References

  • Betegh, G. 2004. The Derveni papyrus. Cosmology, theology and interpretation. Cambridge.
  • Boyarin, D. 2017 [2011]. ‘Logos, a Jewish word. John’s prologue as Midrash.’ In: Levine, A.-J.; Brettler, M. Z. (eds.) The Jewish annotated New Testament, 2nd edition. Oxford. 688–691.
  • Hannah, D. D. 1999. Michael and Christ: Michael traditions and angel christology in early Christianity. Tübingen.
  • Mason, A. 2013. ‘The nous doctrine in Plato’s thought.’ Apeiron 46: 201–228. [DOI]
  • Menn, S. 1995. Plato on God as nous. Carbondale/Edwardsville (IL).
  • Robertson, D. 2018. Word and meaning in ancient Alexandria. Theories of language from Philo to Plotinus. Aldershot/Burlington (VT).

14 September 2020

The classical elements

Earth; Fire; Air; Water. Long ago, Empedocles theorised that four elements lived together in harmony. Then everything changed when Democritus attacked. Only Aristotle could stop him. But when the world needed it most, modern chemistry was still several thousand years from being invented ...

Empedocles’ poems don’t survive. But Aristotle’s Physics and On coming to be and passing away does. As a result, a number of people have got it into their heads that Aristotle was reponsible for the idea of the classical elements. Here’s a snippet from a 2002 lecture by a Florida State physics professor about ‘Aristotelian’ physics:

  • everything on Earth made of (mixture of) four elements: earth, water, air, fire
  • every element has a “natural place”:
    • earth at center of Earth,
    • water above earth,
    • air above water,
    • fire above air;
  • celestial bodies (stars, planets, Moon) made from fifth element, “ether”, which also fills space between them; ether is perfect, incorruptible, weightless; ...

This slide has ended up being cited by the Wikipedia article on ‘Aristotelian physics’ as the supreme authority on the classical elements.

Now, it isn’t completely made up — in the limited sense that some people, including even some specialists, do claim some of these things.

For example Werner Jaeger (1948), Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development, Oxford, 143ff. One report on a lost Aristotelean work refers to the elements earth, water, and air, then refers to the fourth as Latin ardor. Jaeger confidently translates the word as ‘aether’ (149).

But you won’t find any of it in Aristotle himself.

  • Aristotle never says that all matter is made of (a mixture of) earth, water, air, and fire.
  • He doesn’t talk of elements having a ‘natural place’.
  • He doesn’t add aether as a ‘fifth element’.

The thing about aether is probably the biggest one, because I have seen it repeated in so many places. So let’s just repeat. Aristotle doesn’t treat aether as a fifth element.

Here’s what Aristotle does say.

  • He uses Empedocles’ four elements as categories of material qualities, rather than substances.
  • He also refers to Democritus’ model of matter, which is based on atoms, not elements, and which allows an unlimited variety of fundamental substances.
  • He accepts and rejects aspects of both models. He suggests that matter is differentiated by the presence or absence of various properties, rather than the substances it’s made of; and he’s willing to go along with Anaxagoras’ idea that every homogeneous material is an element, to the extent that each homogeneous material corresponds to a unique set of properties.
  • He talks of materials having a natural motion depending on their properties: hot things (including fire and air) tend to rise, that is, move away from the centre of the earth, while cold things (including earth and water) tend to move towards the centre.
  • And, in a discussion that has nothing to do with elements, he does say that the sky uniquely has a circular natural motion — the sky as a single thing, that is, not individual heavenly bodies — and he borrows the ancient name ‘aether’ to refer to this unique motion.

Now a lot of this is wrong of course. Atoms are real; natural motion isn’t a thing, but buoyancy is; it’s the earth that’s rotating, not the sky. But that’s no excuse for misrepresenting Aristotle. His theory of matter is about four physical properties, not about four substances. And nowhere does he declare a canon of five elements, with aether as the fifth.

He even calls Empedocles’ model self-contradictory. Empedocles’ elements are supposed to be distinct, fundamental substances; yet Water evaporates into Air, condensation from Air produces Water.

So Empedocles evidently contradicts the observed phenomena, and contradicts himself too. For he says that none of the elements can emerge from another, but that everything is made of these; but at the same time, once he gathers all of nature (except Strife) into the One, he says that each of the elements is derived from the One.
The early Greek flat-earth cosmology as found in Homer, centuries before Aristotle. Thick, foggy Air is at ground level; above it is the clear Aether, where it is hard to breathe and there are no clouds. Elements played no role in this cosmology.

Aether

A second-hand report of one of Aristotle’s lost works makes it clear that he thought of heavenly bodies as ‘fiery’, and not made of a fifth element.

Therefore, because the Fire of the sun is similar to those fires that exist in the bodies of animate creatures, it must be that the sun is also animate ... So since the origin of some creatures lies in Earth, others in Water, and others in Air, Aristotle thinks it absurd to imagine that no animal is generated in that element which is most suited to generating animate things.

Cicero (our source) goes on to talk about how the ‘stars occupy the aetherial region, which is extremely thin’. Various modern scholars have taken that as meaning that Aristotle, too, linked aether to the usual four elements. But, again, it’s indirect. And even Cicero doesn’t cast aether as the fifth member of a set of five. He refers to ‘the aetherial region’ (aetherium locum) as a location, not a substance. He talks of stars being generated there: that is, Cicero is actually thinking of ‘the aether’ as a place occupied by Fire, but only very sparsely, until it generates stars.

Aether isn’t a distinct element: it’s a hangover from archaic flat-earth cosmologies. For example in Homer, thick misty Air (aēr) is at ground level, and clear, bright Aether (aithēr) is above it, filling the heavens. On mountain-tops the air is thinner, and you find yourself above the clouds: that’s supposedly where you get close to the aether.

The elements in Plato

Aristotle isn’t our earliest source on Empedocles’ elements. There’s an earlier report in Plato’s Timaeus. And it’s Plato, I think, that has prompted some modern readers to think in terms of a group of five.

The passage is hard to interpret (like most of the Timaeus): Plato could be misconstrued as saying that celestial bodies are made of a fifth element. What he really seems to be talking about is the shape of the universe as a whole, not the material that stars are made of.

Aether does come up a bit later, in passing. But Plato makes it very clear that it isn’t a separate element. He treats aether as a variety of Air, in the same way that flames, firelight, and glowing embers are all varieties of Fire (Timaeus 58c-d).

The context is that Plato is trying to combine two theories of matter: Empedocles’ model of four elements, and Democritus’ atomic theory. Plato also injects his own fondness for ideal abstractions. He proposes that each of the four elements is made of a single type of atom, and the four atom types have the shapes of the ‘Platonic solids’. There are five possible Platonic solids, so according to Plato’s perfectionist logic, that implies there must be some fifth thing in the material world that corresponds to the fifth solid, the dodecahedron.

The ‘Platonic solids’: the regular tetrahedron (4 sides), cube (6), octahedron (8), dodecahedron (12), and icosahedron (20). These solids have a number of unique properties that no other solid can have. Each has equilateral faces all the same shape (equilateral triangles, squares, or pentagons); every vertex coincides with the surface of a circumscribed sphere; the centre of every face coincides with the surface of an inscribed sphere.

Of these solids, Plato decides the cube is the most ‘immobile’ one, so that’s Earth. For the others, Fire is the lightest and smallest, made of tetrahedron-shaped atoms; Water is the largest of the triangle-faced solids, the icosahedron; Air is in between, the octahedron.

And, since there was still one more structure — the fifth — God applied it to the whole, and decorated it with life.

‘The whole’ must mean the cosmos, the sky. But not the substance of the sky. In the last bit, ‘decorated it with life’, the Greek word used, diazōgraphōn, is probably meant to evoke the twelve constellations of the zodiac around the ecliptic. The zodiac isn’t arranged in a dodecahedral shape, but perhaps the theme of twelve-ness was enough to sustain Plato’s wordplay.

For Plato, it seems, the dodecahedron is the shape of the cosmos. It looks like the idea is that a dodecahedron is the shape that most closely approximates a sphere — the sphere of the sky.

Surprising but true. Intuitively, you’d imagine an icosahedron would be closer to spherical, because it has more polygons. It turns out that pentagon-shaped faces are more of an advantage. The dodecahedron is better at filling a sphere. If you’re an ancient Greek and you want to calculate the volume of a sphere, but you don’t know the value of pi, and so you resort to the method of exhaustion that was popular in classical Greek geometry, then a dodecahedron provides closer bounds than any other solid.

Solid Number of faces Corresponding phenomenon (Tim. 53c-56e) Volume as proportion of sphere
tetrahedron 4 Fire 12.3%
cube 6 Earth 36.7%
octahedron 8 Air 31.8%
dodecahedron 12 universe 66.5%
icosahedron 20 Water 60.5%
A cube, all of its corners touching a sphere from the inside, fills a bit over a third of the sphere; a dodecahedron fills just under two thirds.

So, in Plato’s model, the dodecahedron is the shape of the universe; the other four solids are the shapes of the four kinds of atoms. Don’t go taking this seriously, of course! Plato liked maths, but he was definitely no empiricist. This whole imaginary concoction is driven by his obsession with the idea that real phenomena are manifestations of ideal abstractions.

Aristotle’s theory of matter

Aristotle is more logical, albeit with the same limitations on his knowledge. Given that he knew nothing about atoms and elements as we understand them nowadays, he still makes a reasonable amount of sense, so far as he goes.

For Empedocles says that there are four physical (elements); or a total of six, including those (elements) that cause motion (i.e. Love and Strife). Anaxagoras and Leucippus and Democritus, on the other hand, say there are infinitely many. The first (Anaxagoras) treats homogeneous things as elements, like Bone, Flesh, and Marrow, and every substance where a portion is synonymous with the whole. Democritus and Leucippus, however, say that these (homogeneous) things consist of indivisible particles, and that they are infinite in number and in their shapes; while substances differ from one another depending on the elements they consist of and their composition and arrangement.

Anaxagoras’ followers apparently take a stance opposed to that of Empedocles' followers. For Empedocles says that there are four elements — Fire, Water, Air, and Earth — and that these are the substances that are simple, rather than flesh and bone and other homogeneous substances. But Anaxagoras’ followers say that it is these homogeneous substances that are simple elements, while Earth, Fire, Water, and Air are compounds.

Aristotle rejects Democritus’ atomic theory, but he also rejects Empedocles. He accepts the four elements as empirical phenomena, but he rejects the idea that everything is made of them. He doesn’t reject Anaxagoras’ ideas about homogeneous substances: it seems that’s where his sympathies lie.

For Aristotle, Empedocles’ elements are emergent. They’re derived from combinations of properties: hot, cold, dry, and wet. Apply these properties to raw matter — what he calls hylē (literally ‘wood’) — and you get stuff that approximates the four elements. If something is hot and dry then it’s fiery, if it’s cold and wet then it’s watery. The properties come first.

  Hot Cold
Wet Air Water
Dry Fire Earth

He quickly gets into trouble, though. Aristotle questions whether these binary properties denote the presence vs. absence of a quality: so hot = ‘with heat present’, cold = ‘without heat’, and so on.

But someone might well be puzzled about a simple absence, and whether it is one of two terms in an opposition. For example, is it that Earth and other massive matter denotes the absence of a quality (heat), while Fire and rising substances denote the presence of that quality? Or is it that Earth also denotes a presence, while the absence denotes raw substance — the hylē of both Fire and Earth alike? And is the hylē of each of them different? For then they could not come to be out of one another, that is, out of their opposites. For the oppositions are manifested in these things: Fire, Earth, Water, Air.

This is where Aristotle’s lack of knowledge gets him tied in knots: this passage makes little sense to a modern reader. It’s obvious to us, with an understanding of chemical reactions and thermodynamics, that these are actually very bad questions. We know that physical properties are determined by heat and pressure, not by irreducible characteristics like whether ‘wetness’ is present.

This business of thinking about presence and absence of qualities misleads Aristotle before he can even begin. I think it’s still a huge improvement on Plato, with his fantasies about four species of polyhedral atom. But it isn’t like you’ll actually learn anything about chemistry from Aristotle.

12 December 2018

Cosmos #3. Hypatia and the library

This is the last of three annotated transcripts of segments on ancient Greek science from Carl Sagan’s Cosmos (1980). See my introduction in part 1 on the impact Cosmos has had, its extraordinary influence in propagating some myths, and in creating others; and my introduction in part 2 on how some misinformation is a direct result of Sagan’s choice to set up science and religion as antithetical to one another.

This final episode is about Alexandria, and the idea that knowledge is something to be treasured. Sagan is right about that. But he’s wrong when it comes to his moral condemnation of the loss of knowledge. He wants to blame someone, and religion is in his sights. He’s right that the loss of knowledge isn’t a good thing -- but it’s also a historical inevitability.

Episode 13. ‘Who speaks for earth?’

YouTube link. First broadcast 21 December 1980.

Carl Sagan:
One of the great revelations of the age of space exploration is the image of the earth, finite and lonely, somehow vulnerable, bearing the entire human species through the oceans of space and time.

But this is an ancient perception. In the 3rd century BC our planet was mapped, and accurately measured, by a Greek scientist named Eratosthenes, who worked in Egypt. This was the world as he knew it. Eratosthenes was the director of the great library of Alexandria, the center of science and learning in the ancient world.

An ancient atlas: Ptolemy’s latitude and longitude data rendered onto Ptolemy’s own projection by Hans van Deukeren. Ptolemy’s atlas followed in the footsteps of several earlier ones, especially Marinus of Tyre, but Eratosthenes was the grandfather of ancient cartography. Eratosthenes’ atlas probably didn’t look much like this, though. Much or most of Ptolemy’s data came from Roman-era surveys; we don’t know what projection Eratosthenes used, but it wasn’t this one; and it’s possible Eratosthenes didn’t arrange his map with north at the top.

Aristotle had argued that humanity was divided into Greeks and everybody else, who he called ‘barbarians’; and that the Greeks should keep themselves racially pure. He taught it was fitting for the Greeks to enslave other peoples. But Eratosthenes criticized Aristotle for his blind chauvinism. He believed there was good and bad in every nation. The Greek conquerors had invented a new god for the Egyptians, but he looked remarkably Greek. Alexander was portrayed as pharaoh in a gesture to the Egyptians. But in practice, the Greeks were confident of their superiority. The casual protests of the librarian hardly constituted a serious challenge to prevailing prejudices. Their world was as imperfect as our own.

Sagan is basically right about Aristotle -- certainly in his criticism of Aristotle’s thinking on slavery, at least, which is awful enough that you will want to shower after reading it (Politics 1.2 = 1253b-1257a).

However, ‘Eratosthenes criticized Aristotle’ is fantasy. We do not know what Eratosthenes thought about racism or even about Aristotle. The surviving fragments of Eratosthenes’ Geographica do not mention Aristotle.

But the Ptolemies, the Greek kings of Egypt who followed Alexander had at least this virtue: they supported the advancement of knowledge. Popular ideas about the nature of the cosmos were challenged, and some of them discarded. New ideas were proposed and found to be in better accord with the facts. There were imaginative proposals, vigorous debates, brilliant syntheses, and the resulting treasure of knowledge was recorded and preserved for centuries on these shelves. Science came of age in this library.

The Ptolemies didn’t merely collect old knowledge. They supported scientific research and generated new knowledge. The results were amazing. Eratosthenes accurately calculated the size of the Earth, he mapped it, and he argued that it could be circumnavigated. Hipparchus anticipated that stars come into being, slowly move during the course of centuries, and eventually perish. It was he who first cataloged the positions and magnitudes of the stars in order to determine whether there were such changes. Euclid produced a textbook on geometry which human beings learned from for 23 centuries. It’s still a great read, full of the most elegant proofs. Galen wrote basic works on healing and anatomy which dominated medicine until the Renaissance. These are just a few examples. There were dozens of great scholars here, and hundreds of fundamental discoveries.

Some of those discoveries have a distinctly modern ring. Apollonius of Perga studied the parabola and the ellipse, curves that we know today describe the paths of falling objects in a gravitational field, and space vehicles traveling between the planets. Heron of Alexandria invented steam engines and gear trains; he was the author of the first book on robots.

Imagine how different our world would be if those discoveries had been explained and used for the benefit of everyone, if the humane perspective of Eratosthenes had been widely adopted and applied. But this was not to be.

Let’s just repeat these two snippets, juxtaposed:
Euclid produced a textbook on geometry which human beings learned from for 23 centuries. ... Galen wrote basic works on healing and anatomy which dominated medicine until the Renaissance.
Imagine how different our world would be if those discoveries had been explained and used for the benefit of everyone ... But this was not to be.
You don’t often see a normally level-headed person contradict themselves quite this quickly.

Alexandria was the greatest city the western world had ever seen. People from all nations came here to live, to trade, to learn. On a given day these harbors were thronged with merchants, and scholars, tourists. It’s probably here that the word ‘cosmopolitan’ realized its true meaning, of a citizen not just of a nation, but of the cosmos. To be a citizen of the cosmos. Here were clearly the seeds of our modern world.

But why didn’t they take root and flourish? Why, instead, did the west slumber through a thousand years of darkness until Columbus and Copernicus and their contemporaries rediscovered the work done here? I cannot give you a simple answer but I do know this: there is no record in the entire history of the library that any of the illustrious scholars and scientists who worked here ever seriously challenged a single political or economic or religious assumption of the society in which they lived. The permanence of the stars was questioned. The justice of slavery was not.

Columbus and Copernicus did not ‘rediscover’ anything. Columbus’ ambitions were solely colonial. He went out of his way to reject Eratosthenes’ work on the size of the earth when his opponents tried to remind him of it in Salamanca, in favour of guesswork and incomplete reports by Marinus of Tyre, Marco Polo, and Pierre D’Ailly.

Copernicus should really be credited as a discoverer rather than a rediscoverer. His idol wasn’t any of the Alexandrian researchers, but Pythagoras, whom Sagan rightly casts as a mystic (see part 2).

Neither of them knew or worked with any ancient sources that were obscure to their contemporaries.

Science and learning in general were the preserve of the privileged few. The vast population of this city had not the vaguest notion of the great discoveries being made within these walls. How could they? The new findings were not explained or popularized. The progress made here benefited them little. Science was not part of their lives.

The discoveries in mechanics, say or steam technology mainly were applied to the perfection of weapons, to the encouragement of superstition, to the amusement of kings. Scientists never seemed to grasp the enormous potential of machines to free people from arduous and repetitive labor. The intellectual achievements of antiquity had few practical applications. Science never captured the imagination of the multitude. There was no counterbalance to stagnation, to pessimism, to the most abject surrender to mysticism. So when at long last the mob came to burn the place down, there was nobody to stop them.

Sagan’s thesis that slavery obstructed the development of ‘science’ -- though really it sounds like he’s talking about industrial engineering, not science -- is coherent, but hugely over-simplified. The connection between slavery and something as distantly connected as engineering is always going to be a complex one, dependent on a huge range of historical circumstances.

The main impact of slavery, insofar as it had anything to do with engineering, was economic. It’s a bit of a trite platitude these days that a slave economy had no need, and no room, for an industrial revolution. On that view, it’s true that it was impossible for industrial engineering to benefit society at large -- but not because of ‘mysticism’, or ‘pessimism’, or a failure of imagination; but because it was economically impossible.

There’s probably some truth to that platitude. But the subject of what the Romans didn’t invent involves speculation and complexities. OK, maybe they didn’t have an economic framework that would reward that kind of industrialisation. But as well as that, they didn’t prize fuel (coal); they didn’t know Boyle’s Law; hell, they didn’t even know Newton’s Laws, not even the First Law. Steam engines depend on all of these things, including the more sophisticated Third Law, that every force has an opposing force. Like it or not, the theoretical considerations are important. Heron probably had only a hazy idea of how his steam engine worked. For the ancients it was a curiosity, not a tool: you can’t scale an industrial tool if you don’t understand how it works.

We’ll hopefully all agree with Sagan that slavery is a bad thing, and that the monstrousness of slavery makes any society like that a model to avoid. But, as so often with Sagan’s historical arguments, there’s absolutely no reason to bring mysticism or superstition into it.

Let me tell you about the end. It’s a story about the last scientist to work in this place. A mathematician, astronomer, physicist, and head of the school of Neo-Platonic philosophy in Alexandria. That’s an extraordinary range of accomplishments for any individual, in any age. Her name was Hypatia. She was born in this city in the year 370 AD.

We do not know the date of Hypatia’s birth. ‘370’ is an estimate based on guessing her age at the time of her death in 415 (Sagan reports her death-date below accurately).

This was a time when women had essentially no options. They were considered property. Nevertheless, Hypatia was able to move freely, unself-consciously through traditional male domains. By all accounts she was a great beauty. And although she had many suitors, she had no interest in marriage.

The Alexandria of Hypatia’s time, by then long under Roman rule, was a city in grave conflict. Slavery, the cancer of the ancient world, had sapped classical civilization of its vitality. The growing Christian church was consolidating its power and attempting to eradicate pagan influence and culture. Hypatia stood at the focus, at the epicenter of mighty social forces. Cyril, the bishop of Alexandria, despised her: in part because of her close friendship with a Roman governor, but also because she symbolized, she was a symbol of learning and science which were largely identified by the early church with paganism.

In great personal danger Hypatia continued to teach and to publish, until in the year 415 AD, on her way to work, she was set upon by a fanatical mob of Cyril’s followers. They dragged her from her chariot, tore off her clothes, and flayed her flesh from her bones with abalone shells. Her remains were burned, her works obliterated, her name forgotten. Cyril was made a saint.

The glory you see around me is nothing but a memory. It does not exist. The last remains of the library were destroyed within a year of Hypatia’s death.

When Hypatia died, in 415, the Serapeum had been gone for 24 years. It was destroyed in 391. I won’t labour the story of exactly how she died, though there are some problems there too.

Sagan also does not mention that one of Hypatia’s best teacher-student relationships was with Synesius, a Christian, who became bishop of Ptolemais and Metropolitan of Pentapolis in 410.

As to the library itself: it’s hard to gauge how much of a library existed in the Serapeum in 391. There’s no mention of it in the accounts of the temple’s destruction (Theodoret, History of the church 5.22; Eunapius, Lives of the sophists 472). Ammianus, writing in the first part of the 300s, refers to a Serapeum library in the past tense, and gives the distinct impression that it was destroyed in Caesar’s invasion in 48 BCE (Ammianus Marcellinus 22.16.12-13).

But there are some sensible counter-arguments too. Alexandria was certainly still a centre of learning. The fact that Theodoret’s and Eunapius’ terse accounts don’t mention books doesn’t mean they weren’t there: it was first and foremost a temple after all. Ammianus is definitely confused about the multiple libraries in classical Alexandria, and appears to have mixed up the Serapeum with the royal library (it was the latter that was destroyed in Caesar’s invasion). Aphthonius, writing in the late 300s (or even later?) describes public book collections in rooms off the temple colonnades, though we can’t be sure his rhetorical exercise is an eyewitness account (Progymnasmata 48 ed. von Spengel; §12 tr. M. Heath). Eunapius talks of Alexandria as ‘a sort of sacred world, because of the temple of Serapis’, but he says this in the context of describing the hordes of students that thronged to become disciples of one Antoninus, who supposedly foretold that the end of the Serapeum would coincide with the death of his philosophy (Lives of the sophists 471(a), 471(b)). That sure sounds like the Serapeum was still an intellectual centre -- or if not, then at least an important element of Alexandrian cultural life.

It’s still pretty vague. There’s enough for some people to believe some fashion of library still existed in 391. But it won’t convince everyone, and there’s certainly no exactness about what did or didn’t exist. If, say, Eunapius’ Antoninus really was a mystic-philosopher, in a sort of Pythagoras-cum-Apollonius-of-Tyana vein, and if that’s representative of what kind of teaching went on at the Serapeum, then it’d be hard to think very highly of its culture. (Who knows, maybe the Serapeum was a bad spot in Alexandria’s intellectual landscape! Hypatia’s mathematical expertise survived it by a few decades, anyway.)

It’s as if an entire civilization had undergone a sort of self-inflicted radical brain surgery so that most of its memories, discoveries, ideas, and passions were irrevocably wiped out. The loss was incalculable. In some cases, we know only the tantalizing titles of books that had been destroyed. In most cases, we know neither the titles nor the authors.

It is vanishingly unlikely that anything at all was lost in 391 that wouldn’t have been lost anyway. The ancient Mediterranean had thousands of libraries. Any book that depended on a single library for its survival was already doomed, because no ancient library has survived to the present. To imagine the survival of any ancient library from antiquity to the present day is to imagine a miracle.

We have reports of many ancient library fires. The case of Alexandria is famous because the library was big during the Ptolemaic era -- and because Sagan has publicised it -- not because its collection was unlike anything else. When 1st century CE Egyptian scribes made the sole surviving copy of Aristotle’s Constitution of the Athenians (BL pap. 131), they certainly didn’t do it in Alexandria: you don’t make a 200 km hike for a job done on the cheap (the papyrus is recycled).

Alexandria has a place of honour in any account of the development of human knowledge. But the story of the loss of ancient knowledge is a story of economics, not of library burnings. In that story, Alexandria doesn’t even warrant a footnote.

We do know that in this library there were 123 different plays by Sophocles, of which only seven have survived to our time. One of those seven is Oedipus rex [Oedipus the king]. Similar numbers apply to the lost works of Aeschylus, Euripides, Aristophanes. It’s a little as if the only surviving works of a man named William Shakespeare were Coriolanus and A winter’s tale, although we had heard that he had written some other things which were highly prized in his time -- plays called Hamlet, Macbeth, A midsummer night’s dream, Julius Caesar, King Lear, Romeo and Juliet.

History is full of people who out of fear, or ignorance, or the lust for power have destroyed treasures of immeasurable value, which truly belong to all of us. We must not let it happen again.

This last bit lays bare the fundamental flaw in Sagan’s thinking. He sees the loss of knowledge as a crime. Where there’s a crime, there must be a criminal.

But that isn’t how it works. The default state of knowledge is not to be preserved. Don’t believe me? Go and try to read a file off a 5½" floppy disk. Hell, try to read a file off a CD-ROM that you burned ten years ago. Preserving knowledge doesn’t mean storage, it means copying, endlessly and without pause. If the reproduction technology is laborious or expensive, as it was in antiquity, it’ll be that much harder.

It doesn’t take much for the process to fail. Even in antiquity, you can find people in the 2nd century CE bemoaning the fact that they can no longer find a copy of one of Cicero’s speeches. As much as half the Epic Cycle may have been lost by the time of Augustus. We don’t know of any ancient writer who ever got to see a copy of book 2 of Aristotle’s Poetics (other than Aristotle himself).

Now, that’s trying to preserve knowledge for just a handful of centuries. If you want it preserved for 1600 years, you have to imagine thousands of people collaborating, with no lasting supervision, no political continuity, no continuity in funding, and no mutual agreement. The fact that anything has survived that long is amazing.

Even nowadays, a couple of decades of neglect would be enough to ensure the destruction of any modern library, acid-free paper or no acid-free paper. Ever heard how the video tapes of the Apollo 11 moon landing were lost? Or conversely, have you heard of the Archimedes palimpsest, and how new technological developments have allowed people to read heavily damaged texts that survived nowhere else? But were you aware that most of the damage to that book was done in the 1900s, not in the mediaeval period? That’s just how it is. Stuff gets lost, stuff gets damaged. If you wait long enough, every library disappears. Alexandria isn’t a tragedy. It’s a miracle that it happened at all, let alone that it lasted 7 centuries.

28 November 2018

Cosmos #2. The Ionians (and others)

The second of three annotated transcripts of segments on ancient Greek science from Carl Sagan’s Cosmos (1980). See my introduction in part 1 on the impact Cosmos has had, its extraordinary influence in propagating some myths, and in creating others.

In this segment, Sagan focuses on natural philosophy from the early Ionians up to Plato, with Aristarchus wedged in rather awkwardly as well. It’s the longest of the three segments: it occupies 23 minutes of the television episode.

Remains of temple of Hera, Samos

Like the Eratosthenes segment, we have a number of misrepresentations. This time, though, it’s much clearer that they aren’t innocent imprecisions for the sake of telling a good story, or imperfect research. Many of the untruths are directly motivated by Sagan’s choice to caricature science and religion as antithetical to one another.

The inventions attributed to Theodorus, or the idea that Pythagoras was a round-earther: those are just harmless fiction. Sagan puts too much trust in unreliable sources: OK, fine, professionals do that too. At worst it’s a little sloppy, but it isn’t dishonest.

But when Sagan decides to cast Democritus and Anaxagoras as atheists, and Plato as a mystic; when he claims that science after Plato entered a ‘long, mystical sleep’, and that Platonists suppressed ‘disquieting facts’ -- that’s a totally different matter. Those are outright fabrications, designed to serve a predetermined narrative.

Claims like that leave a bad taste, especially when Sagan has previously been canonising Kepler, who in 1597 wrote to Galileo of Pythagoras and Plato as ‘our genuine masters’. It’s fine to point out errors made by historical figures. Blaming them for errors that weren’t discovered until thousands of years later, though, is unreasonable. Plato did get many, many things wrong -- but not as many as Empedocles and Democritus. And you’ll notice Sagan doesn’t mention any of the Ionians’ errors. It’s wrong to praise Empedocles as a rationalist and demonise Plato as a mystic, when in reality, Empedocles was a cult leader and Plato founded a university.


Episode 7. ‘The backbone of night’

YouTube link. First broadcast 9 November 1980.

Carl Sagan:
Our ancestors groped in darkness to make sense of their surroundings. Powerless before nature, they invented rituals and myths, some desperate and cruel, others imaginative and benign. The ancient Greeks explained that diffuse band of brightness in the night sky as the milk of the goddess Hera, squirted from her breast across the heavens. We still call it the Milky Way.

In gratitude for the many gifts of the gods, our ancestors created works of surpassing beauty. This is all that remains of the ancient temple of Hera, queen of heaven: a single marble column standing in a vast field of ruins, on the Greek island of Samos. It was one of the wonders of the world, built by people with an extraordinary eye for clarity and symmetry. Those who thronged to that temple were also the architects of a bridge from their world to ours. We were moving once again in our voyage of self-discovery, on our journey to the stars.

The temple of Hera on Samos didn’t appear in any ancient canon of ‘seven wonders’. Sagan had probably read Herodotus 3.60 and his reference to three of the ‘largest works of all the Greeks’, including the temple of Hera and the tunnel built by Eupalinus.

Here, 25 centuries ago on the island of Samos, and in the other Greek colonies which had grown up in the busy Aegean Sea, there was a glorious awakening. Suddenly people believed that everything was made of atoms, that human beings and other animals had evolved from simpler forms, that diseases were not caused by demons or the gods, that the earth was only a planet going around a sun, which was very far away.

This revolution made cosmos out of chaos. Here, in the sixth century BC, a new idea developed, one of the great ideas of the human species. It was argued that the universe was knowable. Why? Because it was ordered, because there are regularities in nature, which permitted secrets to be uncovered. Nature was not entirely unpredictable. There were rules which even she had to obey.

This ordered and admirable character of the universe was called cosmos. And it was set in stark contradiction to the idea of chaos. This was the first conflict of which we know between science and mysticism, between nature and the gods.

But why here, why in these remote islands and inlets of the eastern Mediterranean? Why not in the great cities of India, or Egypt, Babylon, China, Mesoamerica? Because they were all at the center of old empires. They were set in their ways, hostile to new ideas. But here, in Ionia, were a multitude of newly colonized islands and city-states. Isolation, even if incomplete, promotes diversity. No single concentration of power could enforce conformity. Free inquiry became possible. They were beyond the frontiers of the empires. The merchants and tourists and sailors of Africa, Asia, and Europe met in the harbors of Ionia to exchange goods and stories and ideas. There was a vigorous and heady interaction of many traditions, prejudices, languages, and gods.

These people were ready to experiment. Once you are open to questioning rituals and time-honored practices, you find that one question leads to another.

What do you do when you’re faced with several different gods, each claiming the same territory? The Babylonian Marduk and the Greek Zeus were each considered king of the gods, master of the sky. You might decide, since they otherwise had different attributes, that one of them was merely invented by the priests. But if one, why not both?

And so it was here that the great idea arose, the realization that there might be a way to know the world without the god hypothesis; that there might be principles, forces, laws of nature, through which the world might be understood without attributing the fall of every sparrow to the direct intervention of Zeus. This is the place where science was born. That’s why we’re here.

This great revolution happened between 600 and 400 BC. It was accomplished by the same practical and productive people who made the society function. Political power was in the hands of the merchants, who promoted the technology on which their prosperity depended. The earliest pioneers of science were merchants and artisans and their children.

The first Ionian scientist was named Thales. He was born over there in the city of Miletus, across this narrow strait. He had traveled in Egypt and was conversant with the knowledge of Babylon. Like the Babylonians, he believed that the world had once all been water. To explain the dry land, the Babylonians added that their god Marduk had placed a mat on the face of the waters, and piled dirt on top of it. Thales had a similar view, but he left Marduk out. Yes, the world had once been mostly water, but it was a natural process which explained the dry land. Thales thought it was similar to the silting up he had observed at the delta of the river Nile. Whether Thales’ conclusions were right or wrong is not nearly as important as his approach. The world was not made by the gods, but instead was the result of material forces, interacting in nature. Thales brought back from Babylon and Egypt the seeds of new sciences, astronomy and geometry: sciences which would sprout and grow in the fertile soil of Ionia.

Anaximander of Miletus, over there, was a friend and colleague of Thales, one of the first people that we know of to have actually done an experiment. By examining the moving shadow cast by a vertical stick, he determined accurately the lengths of the year and seasons. For ages, men had used sticks to club and spear each other. Anaximander used a stick to measure time.

Ancient sources do attribute the invention of the gnomon to Anaximander, but they are definitely wrong. The use of gnomons to pinpoint dates goes back at least as far as early 2nd millennium BCE Egypt. One important function, it seems, was to pinpoint dates for religious festivals. (Similar interests seem to have existed in the mid-3rd millennium BCE: the alignment of the pyramid of Khufu with the compass points must necessarily have required similar techniques.)

In other words, Sagan’s ‘merchants and artisans’ on the ‘frontiers’ were drawing on techniques that had been pioneered by religious researchers in ‘old empires’.

In 540 BC, or thereabouts, on this island of Samos, there came to power a tyrant named Polycrates. He seems to have started as a caterer, and then went on to international piracy. His loot was unloaded on this very breakwater. But he oppressed his own people. He made war on his neighbors. He quite rightly feared invasion. So Polycrates surrounded his capital city with an impressive wall, whose remains stand to this day.

To carry water from a distant spring through the fortifications, he ordered this great tunnel built. A kilometer long, it pierces a mountain. Two cuttings were dug from either side, which met almost perfectly in the middle. The project took some 15 years to complete. It is a token of the civil engineering of its day, and an indication of the extraordinary practical capability of the Ionians. The enduring legacy of the Ionians is the tools and techniques they developed, which remain the basis of modern technology.

This was the time of Theodorus, the master engineer of the age, a man who is credited with the invention of the key, the ruler, the carpenter’s square, the level, the lathe, bronze casting. Why are there no monuments to this man? Those who dreamt and speculated and deduced about the laws of nature talked to the engineers and the technologists. They were often the same people. The practical and the theoretical were one.

For Samos generally, Sagan is mainly following Herodotus book 3, who discusses Polycrates at length; at 3.60 he mentions Eupalinus’ tunnel and the second temple of Hera (though the temple had collapsed over a century before Herodotus’ time, and been replaced by a third temple, the one shown at the start of this segment). Just bear in mind that plenty of places had engineering feats to their name -- places that were in ‘old empires’ and not on the ‘frontiers’. Think of the pyramids of Egypt, or the ‘hanging gardens’ of Babylon and/or Nineveh (reportedly irrigated by Archimedean screws several stories high, nearly 500 years before Archimedes).

For Theodorus and his supposed inventions, Sagan is following Pliny Natural history 7.198. But in the same passage, Pliny also attributes inventions to mythological figures like the Cyclopes, Prometheus, and Palamedes. He also attributes the inventions of pottery, carpentry, archery, and other prehistoric technologies to specific named individuals. In other words, Pliny’s testimony is totally untrustworthy. Sagan missed an opportunity here: there’s no need to focus on dodgy anecdotes when Theodorus had real accomplishments, especially the temple of Hera on Samos -- why not mention that Theodorus was its architect?

The idea that Polycrates ‘started as a caterer’ seems to be either a misunderstanding or a fiction.

This new hybrid of abstract thought and everyday experience blossomed into science. When these practical men turned their attention to the natural world, they began to uncover hidden wonders and breathtaking possibilities. Anaximander studied the profusion of living things, and saw their interrelationships. He concluded that life had originated in water and mud, and then colonized the dry land. ‘Human beings,’ he said, ‘must have evolved from simpler forms.’ This insight had to wait 24 centuries until its truth was demonstrated by Charles Darwin.

Here’s what Anaximander actually thought: ‘there arose from heated water and earth either fish or fish-like creatures, inside which human beings grew and were retained as fetuses up until puberty; then at last the creatures broke open, and men and women emerged who were already capable of feeding themselves’ (fr. A 30 Diels-Kranz, tr. Waterfield).

Nothing was excluded from the investigations of these first scientists. Even the air became the subject of close examination by a Greek from Sicily named Empedocles. He made an astonishing discovery with a household implement that people had used for centuries. This is the so-called ‘water thief’. It’s a brazen sphere with a neck and a hole at the top, and a set of little holes at the bottom. It was used as a kitchen ladle. You fill it by immersing it in water. If, after it’s been in there a little bit, you pull it out with the neck uncovered, then the water trickles out the little holes, making a small shower. Instead, if you pull it out with the neck covered, the water is retained. Now try to fill it, with the neck covered with my thumb. Nothing happens. Why not? There’s something in the way. Some material is blocking the access of the water into the sphere. I can’t see any such material. What could it be? Empedocles identified it as air. What else could it be? A thing you can’t see can exert pressure, can frustrate my wish to fill this vessel with water if I were dumb enough to leave my thumb on the neck. Empedocles had discovered the invisible. Air, he thought, must be matter in a form so finely divided that it couldn’t be seen.

Empedocles seems to have been much more an esoteric mystic than a scientist. His association with the ‘water thief’ or klepsydra is real -- see Empedocles fr. B 100 Diels-Kranz -- but neither it, nor treating air as a substance, was a novelty. As early as the mid-500s BCE Anaximenes of Miletus explained the earth’s motionlessness in space by claiming that it was suspended by air pressure, and used a klepsydra as an analogy (Anaximenes fr. A 20 Diels-Kranz).

But much of the surviving fragments of Empedocles and testimony about him is very different. He frequently refers to himself as divine. One fragment promises that his initiates will gain the ability to control the weather (fr. B 111 D-K). He shared several mystic teachings with Pythagoras, including reincarnation, and treating broad beans as sacred. Ancient sources regularly conflate Empedoclean, Pythagorean, and Orphic religious doctrines. He claimed, supposedly, that he could walk on air. He died, again supposedly, by falling into a volcano crater. (Maybe while attempting to demonstrate his skills at hovering? That isn’t how Diogenes Laertius tells the story, but it’s a beautiful match for Iamblichus’ stories of Empedocles ‘the air-walker’.)

This hint, this whiff of the existence of atoms, was carried much further by a contemporary named Democritus. Of all the ancient scientists, it is he who speaks most clearly to us across the centuries. The few surviving fragments of his scientific writings reveal a mind of the highest logical and intuitive powers. He believed that a large number of other worlds wander through space; that worlds are born and die; that some are rich and living creatures, and others are dry and barren. He was the first to understand that the Milky Way is an aggregate of the light of innumerable faint stars. Beyond campfires in the sky, beyond the milk of Hera, beyond the backbone of night, the mind of Democritus soared. He saw deep connections between the heavens and the earth. ‘Man,’ he said, ‘is a microcosm’ -- a little cosmos.

Democritus came from the Ionian town of Abdera, on the northern Aegean shore. In those days, Abdera was the butt of jokes. If, around the year 400 BC, in the equivalent of a restaurant like this, you told a story about someone from Abdera, you were guaranteed a laugh. It was, in a way, the Brooklyn of its time. For Democritus, all of life was to be enjoyed and understood. For him, understanding and enjoyment were pretty much the same thing. He said, ‘A life without festivity is a long road without an inn.’ Democritus may have come from Abdera, but he was no dummy.

Democritus understood that the complex forms, changes, and motions of the material world, all derived from the interaction of very simple moving parts. He called these parts atoms. All material objects are collections of atoms, intricately assembled, even we. When I cut this apple, the knife must be passing through empty spaces between the atoms, Democritus argued. If there were no such empty spaces, no void, then the knife would encounter some impenetrable atom, and the apple wouldn’t be cut. Let’s compare the cross sections of the two pieces. Are the exposed areas exactly equal? No, said Democritus, the curvature of the apple forces this slice to be slightly shorter than the rest of the apple. If they were equally tall, then we’d have a cylinder, and not an apple. No matter how sharp the knife, these two pieces have unequal cross sections. But why? Because on the scale of the very small, matter exhibits some irreducible roughness. And this fine scale of roughness Democritus of Abdera identified with the world of the atoms. His arguments are not those we use today. But they’re elegant and subtle and derived from everyday experience. And his conclusions were fundamentally right.

Democritus believed that nothing happens at random, that everything has a material cause. He said, ‘I would rather understand one cause than be king of Persia.’ He believed that poverty in a democracy was far better than wealth in a tyranny. He believed that the prevailing religions of his time were evil, and that neither souls nor immortal gods existed. There is no evidence that Democritus was persecuted for his beliefs. But then again, he came from Abdera.

Democritus definitely believed in both souls and immortal gods. He even regarded the soul as more important than the body (fr. B 187 Diels-Kranz). He considered immaterial things to be made of atoms too, like dreams, colours, and tastes. According to one report, he specified that a living body consists of alternating soul-atoms and body-atoms linked together (fr. A 108 D-K).

There is nothing to suggest that he thought contemporary religions were evil. At most, he divorced natural phenomena like lightning and eclipses from purely supernatural causes. He may not have had a very well-thought-out theology: his ideas about the gods were shifting and inconsistent, Cicero tells us (fr. A 74 D-K).

Sagan’s statement that Democritus believed in many ‘worlds wander[ing] through space’ is misleading. Sagan wants us to think of planets, but it’s really about universes. Sources on Democritus consistently use the word kosmos in this context.

Sagan’s story of the apple slice accurately reflects a story of Democritus posing a paradox to Chrysippus, though the original is in more abstract terms. If a cone is cut by a plane parallel to the base, are the two surfaces equal or not? If equal, the cone must have no slope and so must actually be a cylinder; if unequal, it must have uneven step-like notches or the two slices wouldn’t fit together (fr. B 155 D-K). (A generation earlier, some thinkers had already begun to make mathematical use of infinitesimals: Antiphon of Athens had used exhaustion to set a bound on the area of a circle.)

For what it’s worth, and this is admittedly nit-picking, extant jokes about Abderites date to the 1st centuries BCE and CE, not 400 BCE. The earliest is in Cicero.

However, in his time, the brief tradition of tolerance for unconventional views was beginning to erode. For instance, the prevailing belief was that the moon and the sun were gods. Another contemporary of Democritus, named Anaxagoras, taught that the moon was a place made of ordinary matter, and that the sun was a red-hot stone far away in the sky. For this, Anaxagoras was condemned, convicted, and imprisoned for impiety, a religious crime. People began to be persecuted for their ideas. A portrait of Democritus is now on the Greek 100-drachma note. But his ideas were suppressed, and his influence on history made minor. The mystics were beginning to win.

It is true that Anaxagoras was charged with impiety (asebeia). He wasn’t ‘condemned, convicted, [or] imprisoned’, though. He chose to leave Athens rather than fight the charges.

Democritus’ ideas were not suppressed. That’s made up. Aristotle, Plato, Aëtius, and many others discussed him, cited him, and drew on his ideas.

The idea of treating asebeia as a crime was an oddity in ancient Greece. We know of a handful of prosecutions, but only in Athens, and only between 432 and 399 BCE. This coincided with the Peloponnesian War, a period of intense religious tension in Athens -- not between religious fanatics and atheists, but between old-fashioned and new-fangled types of cult. Diagoras and Socrates weren’t charged with rejecting the god hypothesis, they were charged with introducing new gods. (Though in Socrates’ case it’s clear that it was only a convenient pretext for prosecuting his links to the Thirty Tyrants.) Not that that’s a good thing, mind! But it isn’t a story of mysticism vs. materialism.

You see, Ionia was also the home of another quite different intellectual tradition. Its founder was Pythagoras, who lived here on Samos in the 6th century BC.

According to local legend, this cave was once his abode. Maybe that was once his living room. Many centuries later, this small Greek Orthodox shrine was erected on his front porch. There’s a continuity of tradition from Pythagoras to Christianity. Pythagoras seems to have been the first person in the history of the world to decide that the earth was a sphere. Perhaps he argued by analogy with the moon or the sun; maybe he noticed the curved shadow of the Earth on the moon during a lunar eclipse; or maybe he recognized that when ships leave Samos, their masts disappear last.

Pythagoras believed that a mathematical harmony underlies all of nature. The modern tradition of mathematical argument, essential in all of science, owes much to him. And the notion that the heavenly bodies move to a kind of music of the spheres was also derived from Pythagoras. It was he who first used the word cosmos to mean a well-ordered and harmonious universe, a world amenable to human understanding.

For this great idea, we are indebted to Pythagoras. But there were deep ironies and contradictions in his thoughts. Many of the Ionians believed that the underlying harmony and unity of the universe was accessible -- through observation and experiment, the method which dominates science today. However, Pythagoras had a very different method. He believed that the laws of nature can be deduced by pure thought. He and his followers were not basically experimentalists: they were mathematicians, and they were thoroughgoing mystics.

It’s true Pythagoras was more mystic than mathematician. So far as anyone knows, we don’t owe any mathematics to Pythagoras himself, or even to his immediate followers. The famous right-angled triangle theorem is over 1000 years older, and the Pythagoreans drew on it mainly for mystic symbolism. So in the 3-4-5 right-angled triangle: 3 = male = Osiris, 4 = female = Isis, 5 = child = Horus. Even there, the use of Egyptian gods tends to suggest Hellenistic-era mysticism, centuries later than Pythagoras.

There were some Pythagoreans who were also significant mathematicians, especially Archytas and Philolaus in the 300s BCE. But we’ve got no reason to suspect that the Pythagoreans worshipped numbers or anything like that.

Pythagoras definitely did not know or believe that the earth is spherical. Diogenes Laertius does claim that (8.48), but it is untrue.
  1. Diogenes also attributes round-earthism to Hesiod and Anaximander, and those are both definitely false. (In a similar way Crates of Mallos attributes round-earthism to Homer, also wrongly.)
  2. Other sources show very clearly that the earth’s sphericity was discovered around 400 BCE, a century after Pythagoras’ lifetime. We know of many discussions of the earth’s shape in the 500s and 400s BCE, and without exception they depict it as flat (Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Democritus). After 400, it is routinely known to be spherical, and some sources give well-reasoned arguments (Plato, Aristotle, Archimedes, etc.).
  3. Other sources on the Pythagoreans’ picture of the cosmos show that they actually regarded the earth, moon, sun, and planets as objects attached to the sides of transparent celestial spheres which all orbited around the ‘central fire’ (whatever that may be). Pythagoras was no round-earther -- but maybe it’s even more remarkable that he wasn’t a geocentrist.
The earth’s curved shadow on the moon during a lunar eclipse is one of the pieces of evidence Aristotle cites for the spherical earth (On the sky 297b). So far as I know, no ancient source mentions ships’ masts staying visible over the horizon: that seems to be a modern myth.

They were fascinated by these five regular solids, bodies whose faces are all polygons: triangles or squares or pentagons. There can be an infinite number of polygons, but only five regular solids.

The five so-called ‘Platonic solids’: tetrahedron (4 faces), cube (6), octohedron (8), dodecahedron (12), and icosahedron (20). (These shapes will be especially familiar to players of Dungeons & Dragons.)

Four of the solids were associated with earth, fire, air and water. The cube, for example, represented earth. These four elements, they thought, make up terrestrial matter. So the fifth solid they mystically associated with the cosmos. Perhaps it was the substance of the heavens. This fifth solid was called the dodecahedron. Its faces are pentagons, 12 of them. Knowledge of the dodecahedron was considered too dangerous for the public.

Ordinary people were to be kept ignorant of the dodecahedron. In love with whole numbers, the Pythagoreans believed that all things could be derived from them -- certainly all other numbers. So a crisis in doctrine occurred when they discovered that the square root of two was irrational. That is, the square root of two could not be represented as the ratio of two whole numbers, no matter how big they were. ‘Irrational’ originally meant only that: that you can’t express a number as a ratio. But for the Pythagoreans, it came to mean something else, something threatening, a hint that their world-view might not make sense -- the other meaning of ‘irrational’. Instead of wanting everyone to share and know of their discoveries, the Pythagoreans suppressed the square root of two and the dodecahedron. The outside world was not to know.

All the historical claims in these two paragraphs are false. The association of the regular solids with the elements comes from Plato, not Pythagoras -- hence the title ‘Platonic solids’ (Timaeus 53c-56c). Our earliest evidence of the study of irrational numbers also comes from Plato, who treats them as a discovery made by Theaetetus of Athens (Theaetetus 147d-148b).

The context of the association between the solids and the elements is that the atomists (Leucippus and Democritus) were interested in discovering the shape of individual atoms. Democritus thought fire atoms must be spherical; Plato, or rather Timaeus as depicted by Plato, offers an alternate theory.

The story that the Pythagoreans concealed dodecahedrons or irrational numbers from the public is a late fiction. It starts to appear in the 300s CE, nearly seven centuries after Plato, in Iamblichus and then Pappos (and most of Iamblichus’ stories about Pythagoras are pure fiction). See this post from 2015 for details. In Plato, by contrast, characters react to irrationals with admiration for Theaetetus’ mathematical feat, with no fear and no trace of mysticism.

The Pythagoreans had discovered, in the mathematical underpinnings of nature, one of the two most powerful scientific tools. The other, of course, is experiment. But instead of using their insight to advance the collective voyage of human discovery, they made of it little more than the hocus-pocus of a mystery cult. Science and mathematics were to be removed from the hands of merchants and artisans. This tendency found its most effective advocate in a follower of Pythagoras named Plato. He preferred the perfection of these mathematical abstractions to the imperfections of everyday life. He believed that ideas were far more real than the natural world. He advised the astronomers not to waste their time observing stars and planets. It was better, he believed, just to think about them. Plato expressed hostility to observation and experiment. He taught contempt for the real world, and disdain for the practical application of scientific knowledge. Plato’s followers succeeded in extinguishing the light of science and experiment that had been kindled by Democritus and the other Ionians.

Plato’s unease with the world as revealed by our senses was to dominate and stifle Western philosophy. Even as late as 1600, Johannes Kepler was still struggling to interpret the structure of the cosmos in terms of Pythagorean solids and Platonic perfection. Ironically, it was Kepler who helped re-establish the old Ionian method of testing ideas against observations.

This is Sagan at his worst. The judgement he gives on Plato here, coming after his praise for Empedocles and Democritus, is the rawest hypocrisy. Look at the double standard:
  • Democritus and Plato both think about the shape of atoms: Democritus good, Plato bad.
  • Empedocles and Democritus declare the earth to be a disc, Plato knows it’s a sphere because of empirical evidence {edit: presumably, at least! We don’t get explicit discussion of the evidence until Aristotle.}: Empedocles/Democritus good, Plato bad.
  • Empedocles proclaims himself divine and sets himself up as a cult leader, Plato founds Europe’s first university: Empedocles good, Plato bad.
  • Modern physicists use mathematics as an abstract language for formalising the behaviour of the physical world, Plato uses a theory based on noetic categories and language as a (deeply wrong) attempt at the same goal: modern physics good, Plato bad.
Plato often thought in terms of analogies, but that’s not the same thing as being opposed to empiricism. Sagan’s double standard betrays his ulterior motives. The real reason he doesn’t like Plato isn’t because he was opposed to empiricism, it’s because Plato was influential on Christian thought.

Is it reasonable for Sagan to despise Plato because he was influential on the wrong people? Maybe -- though I think most people, myself included, would say no -- but either way, you don’t have to be dishonest about it.

But why had science lost its way in the first place? What appeal could these teachings of Pythagoras and of Plato have had for their contemporaries? They provided, I believe, an intellectually respectable justification for a corrupt social order.

The mercantile tradition which had led to Ionian science also led to a slave economy. You could get richer if you owned a lot of slaves. Athens, in the time of Plato and Aristotle, had a vast slave population. All of that brave Athenian talk about democracy applied only to a privileged few. Plato and Aristotle were comfortable in a slave society. They offered justifications for oppression.

They served tyrants. They taught the alienation of the body from the mind -- a natural enough idea, I suppose, in a slave society. They separated thought from matter. They divorced the Earth from the heavens -- divisions which were to dominate Western thinking for more than 20 centuries. The Pythagoreans had won.

The theory that a slave economy affects the way people think is coherent -- enough to make a decent essay topic at least. But Sagan would need a lot more than this to back it up. The horror of slavery is much easier to see in economic, moral, and personal terms, than in the history of the scientific method.

Incidentally, Plato and Aristotle didn’t live under a tyranny, but in Athens under a democratic constitution.

In the recognition by Pythagoras and Plato that the cosmos is knowable, that there is a mathematical underpinning to nature, they greatly advanced the cause of science. But in the suppression of disquieting facts, the sense that science should be kept for a small élite, the distaste for experiment, the embrace of mysticism, the easy acceptance of slave societies, their influence has significantly set back the human endeavor.

The books of the Ionian scientists are entirely lost. Their views were suppressed, ridiculed, and forgotten by the Platonists, and by the Christians who adopted much of the philosophy of Plato.

No one suppressed the Ionians. There isn’t a shred of evidence to suggest such a thing. Books disappearing is just what happens if you wait a few centuries. Even in antiquity people complained of no longer being able to find books that were less than 200 years old. Plato’s works got lucky, and were very influential, and so survived. That isn’t the same thing as suppression.

Suppression has happened at various times throughout history, of course. But to attribute it to the Platonists is pure fiction. For example, suppression did occur under the Christian emperor Theodosius, in the 380s and 390s CE, for religious reasons -- but somehow I don’t think that’s the kind of thing Sagan had in mind. The Platonists, and the school that Plato founded, were among Theodosius’ main victims. Correction, following day: as Tim O'Neill points out in the comments below, I blundered here: I was thinking of Justinian’s suppression of Neo-Platonism and closure of the second Academy, over a century later.

Sagan’s sentiments here are based on the idea that the loss of knowledge is a crime, and therefore there must be someone who is responsible for it. That isn’t the case. (Though it is, incidentally, a very Platonic way of thinking.) We’ll come back to that in part 3.

Finally, after a long, mystical sleep, in which the tools of scientific inquiry lay moldering, the Ionian approach was rediscovered. The Western world reawakened. Experiment and open inquiry slowly became respectable once again. Forgotten books and fragments were read once more. Leonardo, and Copernicus, and Columbus were inspired by the Ionian tradition.

During this ‘long, mystical sleep’ lived many of the ancient scientists and empiricists that Sagan elsewhere praises: Eratosthenes (see part 1), Aristarchus (see below), Archimedes, Hipparchus, Ptolemy -- and many, many more, in antiquity and all the way through the mediaeval period too. But let’s not think about them.

Copernicus revered Pythagoras above all the ancients. Columbus didn’t respect anyone, and cherry-picked all the wrong ideas about the size of the earth to suit his colonial agenda. As for Leonardo, I’m afraid I don’t know what he thought of ancient philosophers.

The Pythagoreans and their successors held the peculiar notion that the earth was tainted, somehow nasty, while the heavens were pristine and divine. So the fundamental idea that the Earth is a planet, that we’re citizens of the universe, was rejected and forgotten.

This idea was first argued by Aristarchus, born here on Samos, three centuries after Pythagoras. He held that the Earth moves around the sun. He correctly located our place in the solar system. For his trouble, he was accused of heresy. From the size of the Earth’s shadow on the moon during a lunar eclipse, he deduced that the sun had to be much much larger than the Earth, and also very far away. From this he may have argued that it was absurd for so large an object as the sun to be going around so small an object as the Earth. So he put the sun rather than the earth at the center of the solar system. And he had the earth and the other planets going around the sun. He also had the earth rotating on its axis once a day. These are ideas that we ordinarily associate with the name Copernicus. But Copernicus seems to have gotten some hint of these ideas by reading about Aristarchus -- in fact, in the manuscript of Copernicus’ book, he referred to Aristarchus, but in the final version he suppressed the citation.

Resistance to Aristarchus, a kind of geocentrism in everyday life, is with us still. We still talk about a sun rising and the sun setting. It’s 2,200 years since Aristarchus, and the language still pretends that the earth does not turn, that the sun is not at the center of the solar system. Aristarchus understood the basic scheme of the solar system -- but not its scale. He knew that the planets move in concentric orbits about the sun, and he probably knew their order out to Saturn.

But he was much too modest in his estimates of how far apart the planets are. In order to calculate the true scale of the solar system, you need a telescope. It wasn’t until the 17th century that astronomers were able to get even a rough estimate of the distance to the sun. And once you knew the distance to the sun, what about the stars? How far away are they?

Sagan gives Aristarchus at once too much and too little credit. On the one hand, we can be pretty sure Aristarchus’ heliocentrism wasn’t motivated by empirical evidence, but by assumptions about how the universe ought to be arranged. That’s certainly the case with the only other ancient heliocentrist we know of, Seleucus (see my annotation in Part 1).

On the other hand, Aristarchus didn’t ‘estimate’ the size of the solar system. He calculated it.

His result was off, because the observations he based it on were inexact. But the method was sound in principle. He measured the angle between the sun, earth, and moon, when both sun and moon were in the sky, at half-moon. Half-moon is special, because at that time the line between the moon and an observer on earth is perpendicular to the line between the moon and the sun. In other words, the sun-moon-earth triangle is a right-angled triangle.

That means you can do trigonometry on it. And Aristarchus was a pioneer in trigonometry. (See Aristarchus’ inequality, a theorem that he used in this very calculation.)

An accurate observation would make the sun-earth-moon angle 89.85° at half-moon. Aristarchus measured it as about 87°. Unfortunately, when you’re dealing with angles close to 90°, a small error in the observation means a large error in the result. So Aristarchus reckoned the sun as being only 18-20 times further away than the moon, when in reality it’s about 390 times further away.

Aristarchus’ measurement of the size of the solar system. At half-moon, Aristarchus reasoned, the angle where the moon is is a right angle. He could measure the angle where earth is, θ, albeit not very precisely. The relative distance of the sun and moon is given by 1/cos θ. For θ = 87°, that comes out close to 19. Aristarchus essentially invented the cosine function for this calculation.